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Abstract 
In legal settings, jury members, police, and legal professionals often have to make 
judgements about witnesses’ or victims’ memories of events. Without a scientific 
understanding of memory, (often erroneous) beliefs are used to make decisions. Evaluation of 
the literature identified two prevalent beliefs that could influence judgements: 1) memory 
operates like a video recorder therefore, accounts that are detailed are more believable than 
those containing vague descriptions, and 2) memories recalled with congruent emotion are 
more believable than those recalled with incongruent emotion. A 2 (emotionality: emotional, 
non-emotional) x 2 (detail: high, low) factorial design was generated. In line with previous 
research, participants made believability judgements (Experiment 1) but uniquely, 
participants were also asked to judge the reliability of the rememberer’s recall (Experiment 
2). Self-reported confidence, personality measures, and political orientation were also 
recorded. Believability judgements did not vary as a function of detail or emotion but detailed 
accounts were judged as more reliable than vague accounts. Confidence and believability 
were positively correlated, whereas the confidence-reliability relationship was more complex. 
Personality and political measures were independent of judgements of both constructs. Our 
results suggest that believability and reliability are distinct constructs and should be examined 
as such in future research.  
Keywords: credibility judgements, reliability, believability, autobiographical memory, 
emotional memory 
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Memory judgements: the contribution of detail and emotion to assessments of believability 
and reliability 
At various stages of the legal process, individuals such as the police, legal 
professionals, and jurors might have to make judgements about witnesses’ or victims’ 
memories of experienced events. Indeed, in many cases, memories constitute the primary, or 
even sole, evidence, meaning that the outcome of these judgements is pivotally important. A 
body of literature exists which has examined how judgements of memories are made, 
however this has focused almost entirely on judgements of believability (Bell & Loftus, 
1989; Bollingmo, Wessel, Eilertsen, & Magnussen, 2008; Bollingmo, Wessel, Sandvold, 
Eilertsen, & Magnussen, 2009; Kaufmann, Drevland, Wessel, Overskeid & Magnussen, 
2003; Wessel, Bollingmo, Sonsteby, Nielsen, Eilertsen & Magnussen, 2012). Often 
conceptualised as credibility, these judgements look to establish whether a given account is 
truthful, such that it overlays objective reality (see Conway, 2005 for a discussion on truth in 
memory research) and is without deliberate commission or omission. In this paper, we extend 
investigation of memory judgements to include assessments of the rememberer’s reliability. 
Based on the assumption that the rememberer is recalling without deliberate deception, we 
conceptualise reliability as the judgement of the accuracy of a given individual’s memory for 
an event, based on the understanding that memory is fallible and error prone (see “sins” of 
commission, Schacter, 1999). In other words, there may be circumstances where the 
truthfulness of an individual’s statement is not in doubt, but their ability to recall accurately 
may be (for discussion of these concepts within a legal setting see Rosenthal, 2002). We are 
interested in understanding if memory judgement research should extend beyond the reach of 
believability and should also encompass the measurement and analysis of reliability. In this 
paper, we examine how judgements of believability and reliability are made. We assess 
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whether these are independent constructs and investigate the extent to which both types of 
judgements are influenced by the content of the memory account. 
Common-sense beliefs about memory 
What might underpin lay people’s decisions about the believability and reliability of 
memories? Research shows that common sense beliefs (Conway, Justice & Morrison, 2014) 
are central (see Bornstein, 2017, for a review). Such beliefs are based on one’s experience, 
one’s understanding of the experience of others, and are possibly shaped by cultural 
influences such as representations of memory in films, books and television shows. 
Researchers have focused on the way people understand memory across a variety of 
populations in a range of contexts, enabling us to draw firm conclusions about the nature of 
common sense beliefs about memory. For instance, studies have investigated general beliefs 
about memory across the US (Simons & Chabris, 2011) and Norwegian public (Magnussen et 
al., 2006), as well as research psychologists, clinical psychologists, hypnotherapists, 
undergraduates (Ost, Easton, Hope, French & Wright, 2017; Patihis, Ho, Tingen, Lillenfeld 
& Loftus, 2013), and legal professionals (Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas & Bradshaw, 
2006; Wise & Safer, 2004). Beliefs about memories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) from 
the public (McGuire & London, 2017; Wessel, Eilertsen, Langnes, Magnussen, & Melinder, 
2016), law students (Ernberg & Landström, 2016) and specialist CSA prosecutors (Ernberg, 
Tidefors, & Landström, 2016) have received more recent attention. Results from this wide 
body of research constitute a wealth of evidence and converge towards a similar position: 
individuals who do not have specific understanding of the scientific underpinnings of 
memory are likely to hold a wide variety of beliefs. Although these memory beliefs may 
seem plausible, and some may be supported by contemporary memory science, many are 
likely not to be. Further, an evaluation of this literature shows two prevalent, inaccurate 
beliefs. Firstly, that memory operates like a video recorder and as such is a permanent, literal 
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or near-literal, reliable recording of an event (see Niedźwieńska, Neckar & Baran, 2007 and 
Ost et al., 2017 for latent construct analyses of memory beliefs). Memories recalled with high 
detail are therefore judged as being more credible than those recalled with vague detail 
(Conway et al., 2014). Secondly, the literature reveals that memories recalled with an 
(perceived) emotionally congruent response (Kaufmann et al., 2003) are necessarily more 
credible than those with an (perceived) emotionally incongruent response. 
Detail, emotion and memory 
Turning to beliefs assessing memory permanence, Simons and Chabris (2011) found 
that 63% of a sample of the US public agreed that memory works like a video camera. In the 
UK, this figure has been found to be between 65% and 70% for the public, and 62% for 
police (Conway, Justice & Morrison, 2014). Results from Niedźwieńska et al., (2007), Ost et 
al., (2016) and Patihis et al., (2014), similarly found that individuals tended to support 
concepts of memory that relate to its believed permanence and stability. It follows then, that 
individuals who hold this cluster of beliefs would grant more credibility to memories that are 
rich in detail than those containing vague descriptions, based on the notion that the contents 
of a memory mirror the proceedings of an event, and as such, most details should be 
adequately recalled. Indeed, this pattern of findings has been found within the memory 
beliefs literature (Ernberg et al., 2016; Magnussen et al., 2012) and has been established 
experimentally across a series of studies (Bell & Loftus, 1989; Reyes, Thompson & Bower, 
1980; Wells & Leippe, 1981). Termed “trivial persuasion” by Bell and Loftus (1989), these 
studies confirmed the ameliorative effect of the inclusion of detail in an account on credibility 
and guilt judgements. However, these widely held beliefs contradict over thirty years of 
memory research; it does not follow that a detailed account is necessarily more credible. The 
level of detail included in an account is affected not only by whether or not the event has 
been experienced (as opposed to imagined) (Vrij, 2008), but also contextual factors such as 
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the passage of time. Memories are psychological representations of an event, and as such, do 
not “record” information in verbatim or even near-verbatim detail. The human memory 
system is constructive, information is activated from across disparate neural regions and is 
compiled in an act of remembering. In other words, each time a memory is recalled it is 
constructed anew, leading to edits, changes and forgetting; autobiographical memory is 
fallible, impermanent and malleable (see Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  
It is often found that the public, police and legal professionals believe that memories 
recounted with congruent emotional affect are more credible than those recalled with 
incongruent emotional affect (Ernberg et al., 2016; McGuire & London, 2017; Wessel et al., 
2016). Incidentally however, Katz, Paddon, and Barnetz (2016) in a review of CSA 
interviews, found that the majority of CSA disclosure by children is neutral or non-emotional. 
Nevertheless, further support for the emotion-credibility belief comes from experimental 
research which has found that emotionally congruent accounts of rape (i.e. those that display 
negative emotions) are judged as more credible than accounts that show no clear, or non-
congruent (i.e. positive) emotion (Bollingmo et al., 2008; Bollingmo et al., 2009; Kaufmann 
et al., 2003). Indeed, this effect is so ubiquitous that it has been termed the “emotional victim 
effect” (Ask & Landström, 2010) and is thought to occur due to perceived stereotypes about 
“appropriate” rape victim behaviour (Wessel et al., 2012). As is evident then, a strong link 
has been established between perceived emotionally-appropriate/congruent recall and 
credibility judgements. However, this body of research has largely centered around child 
witnesses in CSA investigations and female victims of rape; little is known about whether 
emotionality operates as conduit for credibility outside of these areas of evidence giving and 
as such, our research will be the first to address this.  
It is also important to note that emotionality and detail are not univariate concepts, 
both characteristics can feature concurrently in accounts; a memory can be both, partly, or not 
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at all detailed and emotional. Little previous research has investigated the co-occurrence of 
these characteristics in memory accounts (for an early review see Heuer & Reisberg, 1992). 
Therefore, one of the aims of this research is to investigate the effect of the inclusion of detail 
and emotion in a memory account on judgements of both believability and reliability. We 
hypothesise that an account that is detailed and emotionally congruent will receive higher 
believability judgements than accounts that have a lower amount of detail and are less 
emotional. However, since the vast majority of previous research assessing memory 
credibility focuses on the judgement of believability, it is unknown how the manipulation of 
detail and emotion will affect judgements of reliability. It does seem to follow logically that a 
similar pattern of responding will be found, such that detailed, and emotionally appropriate 
accounts will be judged as being more reliable than those with lower detail and/or non-
emotional content. 
Individual differences in beliefs about autobiographical memory 
A further concern that has yet to receive attention in research assessing memory 
judgements is that of individual differences. Previous research exists which suggests that 
individual differences, specifically personality traits, mediate memory processes (Arana, 
Meilan & Perez, 2008; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Flehmig, Steinborn, Langner, & 
Westhoff, 2007; Zhu et al., 2010). Specifically, susceptibility to false memory is associated 
with high scores of dissociation and low scores of extroversion (Hyman & Billings, 1998; 
Porter, Birt, Yuille & Lehman, 2000). Further, individuals who score highly in extraversion 
and low in neuroticism are found to be more accurate witnesses as compared to individuals 
scoring low on extroversion and high on neuroticism (Areh & Umek, 2004). What is clear 
then is that there are links between memory and personality traits, however, the majority of 
this research has focused on the association of personality and memory recall, rather than 
assessing the link between personality and judgements of the memory of others. To address 
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this knowledge gap, we employed the Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI, Gosling, 
Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003), which is a validated short form of the Big-5 (Goldberg, 1992) 
and the Dirty Dozen (Jonason & Webster, 2010), a validated short form of the Dark Triad 
(Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Since there is no previous research in this area, we speculate 
that individuals high in agreeableness and openness will be more likely to rate memory 
accounts as believable, particularly if they contain emotional information.  
A further way of capturing the effect of individual differences is to consider how 
political orientation might influence beliefs about memory. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski and 
Sulloway (2003) argue that political conservatism is a belief system underpinned by a need to 
avoid uncertainty, as well as sensitivity to fear and threat. Behavioural and neurocognitive 
differences have been found between those who identify as politically conservative or liberal 
(Amodio, Jost, Master & Yee, 2007; Kanai, Feilden, Firth & Ress, 2011). These differences 
are relevant to the way in which reported memories might be judged. Liberal and 
conservative individuals exhibit differences in emotional processing, with liberals tending to 
be more agreeable and therefore more compassionate (Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu & Peterson, 
2010). Individuals at either end of the political spectrum may also assess information 
differently, with evidence pointing towards conservatives being both less tolerant of 
ambiguity and more dogmatic. A measure of political orientation was included in the study 
with the aim of assessing whether judgements of memory differed across liberals and 
conservatives. Whilst there is no previous research in this area, we speculate that individuals 
who are more politically liberal will be more likely to believe memory accounts, particularly 
if they are emotional. 
The relationship between confidence and memory assessments 
Lastly, confidence has been shown to play a major role in courtroom decision making 
(Wixted & Wells, 2017). In particular, it is consistently found that mock jurors and triers of 
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fact are more likely to perceive both adult and child witnesses as credible if they appear 
confident (Cramer, Brodsky & DeCoster, 2009; Leippe, Manion & Romanczyk, 1992). 
Indeed, it has been found that juries are more likely to convict when witnesses report being 
confident (Brewer & Burke, 2002; Penrod & Cutler, 1999; Tenney, MacCoun, Spellman & 
Hastie, 2007). A substantial body of research exists that has examined confidence in one’s 
own memory judgements (Wixted, Mickes, Clark, Gronlund & Roediger, 2015), and other 
work suggests that jurors confident in their own decisions will fail to weigh evidence 
presented to them equally, placing more emphasis on the information they believe (Levesque, 
2006). However, little research exists that has investigated the relationship between 
confidence and judgements of other people’s memories. As such, to begin understanding this 
relationship, we took confidence measures of each judgement. We hypothesise that 
confidence will have a positive association with both judgement of believability and 
reliability, such that the more believable or reliable a memory is judged to be, the more 
confident the participant will be in their judgement. 
Aims 
In sum, we are investigating how two widely held, erroneous beliefs (memory 
permanence and emotional-credibility) influence judgements of memory believability, but 
also, uniquely, judgements of rememberer reliability. To do this, we will ask participants to 
make judgements of vignettes detailing autobiographical memories of a theft of a personal 
item. This event was chosen since we felt that judgements were less likely to be influenced 
by the sex of the participant (in comparison to a crime such as rape for example, which may 
be perceived and judged differently by males and females) and victim responses to a personal 
theft would likely span emotions that vary in negativity and intensity, affording all vignettes 
ecological validity. Personality measures (TIPI (Gosling et al., 2003); Dirty Dozen (Jonason 
& Webster, 2010)) and political orientation of participants will be taken, allowing us to 
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provide the first investigation into the link between personality and memory judgements. 
Finally, we aim to understand if believability and reliability are independent constructs, and if 
both should be considered in future work assessing the judgements of memory. 
Experiment 1: Believability 
Previous research investigating how memories are judged has almost entirely focussed on 
credibility, asking participants to decide whether or not, or how likely it is, that a memory 
account is truthful (Bell & Loftus, 1989; Bollingmo et al., 2008; Bollingmo et al., 2009; 
Kaufmann et al., 2003; Wessel et al., 2012). Since there exists a body of literature assessing 
this measure, we completed the experiment assessing believability first, with the following 
hypotheses based on previous findings: 
1. Accounts high in detail will be judged as more believable than those low in detail. 
2. Accounts that include emotion will be judged as more believable than those that are 
non-emotional. 
3. Detail and emotion will have an additive effect, such that highly detailed and 
emotional accounts will be most believed. 
4. Self-rated confidence will be positively correlated with believability judgements 
across all levels of detail and emotion. 
In the absence of previous literature, we also explored the relationships between the 
following variables: 
1. Ratings of agreeableness, openness and believability across accounts varying in detail 
and emotion.  
2. Political orientation and ratings of believability 
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Methods 
Participants. Forty-four participants (29 [65.9%] female), with a mean age of 36.2 
years (SD = 11.9, range = 21 - 70), took part in the experiment. Participants were recruited 
via social media (Facebook, Twitter) and through email advertisements at Nottingham Trent 
University. Participants completed the study individually, online. The project was granted 
ethical approval from the Nottingham Trent University ethical review panel. 
Design. Memory vignettes were randomly presented according to a 2 (detail: high, 
low) x 2 (emotion: emotional, non-emotional) within-subjects factorial design, resulting in 
four different memory types 1) low detail, non-emotional, 2) low detail, emotional, 3) high 
detail, non-emotional, 4) high detail, emotional. To assess consistency of ratings, two 
experimental blocks were used, meaning that each participant saw each memory type twice, 
requiring them to rate eight memories. The outcome measures were memory believability and 
confidence of judgement.  
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Materials and Procedure. Participants followed an anonymous link to the study. 
They were provided with an information page detailing key instructions and then asked to 
provide consent. Demographic information was collected (age and sex) followed by two 
personality measures: Ten Item Personality Measures (TIPI; (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 
2003)) and the Dirty Dozen (Jonason & Webster, 2010), which together encompass 
measurements of agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, openness 
(TIPI) and psychoticism, narcissism and Machiavellianism (Dirty Dozen), to understand if 
personality traits are associated with judgements of memory believability. Both personality 
scales were measured on a 7-point scale from 1-strongly disagree to 7-strongly agree. Short 
versions of scales were used to facilitate a short study duration. Participants were then asked 
to indicate their political orientation on a 7-point scale from extremely conservative through 
to extremely liberal. Next, participants were presented with an information screen with the 
following instructions: 
Next you will be presented with eight memories. These memories depict a theft of a 
personal item. The accounts were originally given to the police following the theft and 
are now being given to an insurance company to claim back for the stolen item(s). 
Please read the memories carefully and answer the questions presented after each 
account.  
To ensure that the length of the vignette and the information presentation order was 
controlled for, all vignettes were designed using the eight elements depicted in Figure 1. Date 
of event, current activity, criminal event and stolen item were all fixed elements, in that they 
were not part of the experimental manipulation. For these, eight different yet conceptually 
similar items were generated, for example, stolen item consisted of gender-neutral personal 
items such as laptop, car keys or mobile phone.  
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
For each of the experimental elements (recall statement, detail: perpetrator, detail: 
speech and emotionality statement) eight items were generated, four in the low/neutral 
condition, four in the high. All high and low statements were matched. For example, a low 
detail was “he was dressed in darkish clothes” and the matched high detail was “he was 
wearing a dark brown jacket”. Figure 1 shows matched high and low/neutral examples. 
Final vignettes were generated by randomly selecting fixed elements, then randomly 
selecting experimental elements that were condition appropriate. For example, only 
emotional elements were entered into the pool for emotional vignettes. Some manual 
selection was then used to ensure that the vignettes were semantically appropriate, and 
linguistic elements were added to provide the vignette with a narrative-like structure. 
Appendix 1 lists all vignettes. 
Participants were then asked to answer the following questions using the scale: “In 
your opinion, is this person telling the truth about what happened?” and “How confident are 
you that your judgement is correct?” Both questions were rated on an 11-point rating scale 
presented in steps of 10, ranging from 0 (not at all believable) to 100 (completely believable). 
Once both these judgements had been made, participants moved on to the next memory 
vignette. Memories were randomly presented to the participants to prevent any order effects. 
After completing the rating of all 8 memories, participants were presented with a debrief. 
Results 
 Believability judgements.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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Firstly, consistency of believability rating within memory types was calculated. This 
analysis was completed to ensure that the manipulations were the main drivers of results, and 
not the content of the memories themselves.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
A series of four paired t-tests were run for each pair of vignettes. No significant 
differences were found between believability ratings of high detail, non-emotional (t(42) = 
.88, p = .38), low detail, emotional (t(43) = 1.01, p = .32) and low detail, non-emotional 
(t(43) = .15, p = .88) vignettes. However a significant difference was found for vignettes in 
the high detail, emotional condition (t(42) = 6.23, p < .001), see Table 1.  
Next, believability ratings were assessed as a function of both detail and emotion. A 
linear mixed effects model was run using lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker & Walker, 2015) in 
Rstudio Version 1.1.383 (RStudio Team, 2016) to account for the hierarchical structure of the 
data (multiple responses from each participant) and to include the random effect of vignette. 
To obtain p-values, models were contrasted with a null model (a model with a constant in 
place of fixed effects) using likelihood ratio tests. Results revealed that neither the main 
effect (χ2 (2) = 1.70, p = .43) model nor the interaction model (χ2 (3) = 1.73, p = .63) was 
significantly different from the null or each other; neither detail, emotion nor the interaction 
of the two significantly influenced believability ratings see Figure 2. 
In light of the significant difference of ratings between high detail and emotional 
vignettes, we ran an additional model to try and understand what variables might have been 
affecting believability ratings. We visually assessed the vignettes and noticed that although 
we controlled for the content, there were differences in overall length. As such, we entered 
word count along with emotion and detail as an additional predictor in the main effects 
model. Results revealed that the model was significantly different to the null model (χ2 (4) = 
11.77, p = .02). Examination of the model showed that word count was a significant predictor 
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of believability, highlighting that participants’ ratings of believability increased as vignette 
word count decreased (b = -.81). 
Individual differences. A linear mixed effects model with participant and vignette as 
random effects was used to assess believability and confidence ratings as a function of 
personality and political orientation. Each dimension of the TIPI, the Dirty Dozen and 
political orientation was entered into the model as a fixed effect, however no significant 
results were found, showing that none of the personality measures (χ2 (5) = 2.93, p = .71) or 
political orientation (χ2 (8) = 4.61, p = .80) were associated with believability judgements. 
Further, neither personality measures (χ2 (5) = 6.93, p = .23) nor political orientation (χ2 (7) = 
8.31, p = .31) had a significant effect on confidence ratings. 
Confidence. Turning next to confidence ratings, no significant differences were found 
between confidence ratings of high detail, emotional (t(42) = -1.95, p = .06), high detail, non-
emotional (t(42) = .99, p = .33), low detail, emotional (t(43) = -.99, p = .33) and low detail, 
non-emotional (t(43) = -.85, p = .40) vignettes. These results showed that the experimental 
manipulation yielded similar confidence scores for the vignettes in the same condition. 
Similar to believability ratings, confidence was modelled as a function of detail and emotion 
using main effect and interaction linear mixed effects models. Neither model was 
significantly different from the null model (main effects: χ2 (2) = .21, p = .90, interaction:  χ2 
(3) = .26, p = .97) showing that confidence ratings were not influenced by the detail or 
emotionality of the vignettes.  
Due to the significant finding of word count in the believability measure, noted above, 
we also ran a second model with word count as an additional predictor in the main effects 
model of confidence. However, results revealed no significant difference between the model 
and the null (χ2 (3) = 6.95, p = .07) indicating that confidence in believability judgement was 
not influenced by vignette word count. 
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A significant positive correlation was however found between confidence ratings and 
believability judgements (r = 0.42, p < .001), showing that as believability judgements 
increase, so too does the associated confidence rating. The correlation between believability 
and confidence was also investigated across all combinations of detail and emotion to see if 
the different memory types affected the level of association. Significant positive correlations 
were found for all four combinations: high detail, emotional (r = .55, p < .001), high detail, 
non-emotional (r = .42, p < .001), low detail, emotional (r = .45, p < .001) and low detail, 
non-emotional (r = .26, p < .02). These results show that as believability judgements increase 
so too do confidence ratings. 
Discussion 
Contrary to our predictions, believability judgements and reported confidence were 
not affected by detail or emotion, with most vignettes being rated as moderately believable. 
This finding is surprising given that the existing body of work highlights ubiquitous beliefs 
held regarding believability, detail and emotion (Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas & 
Bradshaw, 2006; Ernberg & Landström, 201; Ernberg, Tidefors, & Landström, 2016; 
Magnussen et al., 2006; McGuire & London, 2017; Ost, et al., 2017; Patihis et al., 2014; 
Simons & Chabris, 2011; Wessel, Eilertsen, Langnes, Magnussen, & Melinder, 2016; Wise & 
Safer, 2004). Based on our results it would appear then that these beliefs do not underlie 
judgements of believability. Further, contrary to our predictions, no relationship was found 
between personality type, political orientation and believability judgement. Confidence 
ratings and believability judgements however, were significantly positively correlated across 
all vignettes and for each of the four experimental conditions.  
In addition, curiously, one vignette (shown below) received significantly higher 
believability ratings and had a lower standard deviation than all others: 
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On the 3rd of February, I was going for a walk. He came from nowhere, shoved me 
over and stole my phone. My memory of the event is very vivid. He had wiry blonde 
hair and muttered “give me your phone now”. I felt utter panic. 
This vignette fell into the high detail, emotional condition, suggesting that this interaction of 
characteristics gives rise to the highest judgement of believability. However, its counterpart 
vignette, also high in detail and emotional, was rated the lowest of all vignettes in 
believability, such that the effect cannot be attributed to the presence of both variables in the 
high condition. We were interested to understand what might have caused this variability in 
ratings and after visually inspecting the vignettes noticed a difference in length. Results 
revealed that word count was a significant predictor of believability ratings with lower word 
counts predicting higher believability ratings. This finding then suggests that information 
presented in a succinct manner, regardless of the number of details or the emotionality in the 
account, is more likely to be believed. Perhaps simplicity of recounting, then, is important in 
assessing believability. There has been little previous research that has assessed account 
length and believability ratings, however a study reported in Johnson, Bush and Mitchell 
(1998) found no difference in believability of vignettes after systematically varying word 
count. Since these findings are contradictory, and indeed, we did not systematically vary 
word count, further work is needed here to explore and replicate the effect of word count on 
believability judgements.   
 
Experiment 2: Reliability 
Credibility is broadly referred to as the believability of a rememberer; an assessment 
of the individual’s veracity. However, there may be cases when the authenticity of the 
individual is not under question, but instead, the reliability of their memory is. Limited 
research has been conducted around this measurement (for an exception see Reality 
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Monitoring (Johnson & Raye, 1918)) and so, we present a second experiment which rather 
than asking for believability judgements, asked participants to judge the reliability of a 
memory account. This experiment aimed to understand if judgements of a rememberer’s 
reliability could be influenced by the inclusion/exclusion of memory characteristics, 
specifically, detail and emotion.  
Similar to believability judgements, we hypothesised that: 
1. Accounts high in detail and will yield increased reliability judgements. 
2. Emotional will yield increased reliability judgements. 
3. Accounts high in both detail and emotional accounts will yield increased reliability 
judgements. 
4. Confidence will be positively correlated with these judgements across all memory 
types. 
In the absence of previous literature, we also explored the relationships between the 
following variables 
1. Ratings of agreeableness, openness and reliability across accounts varying in detail 
and emotion 
2. Political orientation and ratings of reliability 
Method 
Participants. Forty participants (28 [68.3%] female), with a mean age of 35.2 (SD = 
12.9, range = 19 - 71), took part in the experiment. Participants were recruited via social 
media (Facebook, Twitter) and through email advertisements at Nottingham Trent University. 
Participants completed the study individually, online.  
Design, Materials and Procedure. The design, materials and procedure were 
identical to those in Experiment 1, apart from the following exception: after each memory 
was presented, participants were not asked about believability, but instead were asked the 
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following question: “In your opinion, does this person have a reliable memory for what 
happened?” The response was provided on an 11-point rating scale presented in steps of 10, 
ranging from 0 (not at all reliable) to 100 (completely reliable). 
Results 
Reliability judgements. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Paired t-tests were run for each memory type to assess consistency of reliability 
ratings. No significant differences were found between reliability ratings of high detail, 
emotional (t(37) = -.73, p = .42), high detail, non-emotional (t(38) = -.30, p = .77), low detail, 
emotional (t(39) = .73, p = .47) and low detail, non-emotional (t(39) = -.20, p = .85) 
vignettes. 
 [INSERT FIGURE 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Next, reliability ratings were assessed as a function of detail and emotion in the 
vignettes. As in Experiment 1, both main effects and interaction linear mixed effects models 
were run, and p-values were generated by contrasting all models to a null model using 
likelihood ratio tests. Results showed that the main effects model (χ2 (2) = 25.94, p < .001) 
and the interaction model (χ2 (3) = 26.25, p < .001) were significantly different from the null. 
The main effects model and the interaction models were however not significantly different 
from each other (χ2 (1) = .31, p = .58) showing that the main effects model fit the data best.  
Paired comparisons with a Tukey correction revealed that the significant results were driven 
only by the effect of detail, such that vignettes with high detail were rated higher in reliability 
than those with low detail (mean difference = 16.61, p < .001), main effects of detail and 
emotion are illustrated in Figure 3 and Figure 4 respectively.  
Following on from the significant findings of word count and believability ratings in 
Experiment one, we ran a second linear mixed effects model, including word count as a 
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predictor alongside detail and emotion. However, results revealed that word count was not a 
significant predictor of reliability rating (χ2 (1) = .27, p = .60). 
Individual Differences. As in Experiment 1, a linear mixed effects model with 
participant and vignette entered as random effects was used to investigate reliability 
judgements and confidence ratings as a function of personality and political orientation. For 
both models, fixed effects were each dimension of the Ten Item Personality Inventory, the 
Dirty Dozen (Machiavellianism, psychopathy and narcissism) and political orientation. 
Neither the personality model (χ2 (8) = 2.89, p = .94) or the political orientation model (χ2 (5) 
= 3.31, p = .65) was significantly different from their respective null model, showing that 
reliability judgements were not associated with the personality measures taken (χ2 (8) = 7.09, 
p = .53), or with political orientation (χ2 (5) = 5.16, p = .40).  
Confidence. A series of paired t-tests revealed that there were no significant 
differences of confidence ratings for high detail, emotional (t(37) = -.79, p = .44), high detail, 
non-emotional (t(38) = -.91, p = .37), low detail, emotional (t(38) = -.39, p = .70) and low 
detail, non-emotional (t(39) = -.61, p = .54) vignettes. A linear mixed effects model also 
showed that there were no significant differences in confidence ratings of reliability 
judgements between the null model, the main effects model of detail and emotion (χ2 (2) = 
3.77, p = .15) or the interaction model (χ2 (1) = .22, p = .64).  
We also ran a second model with word count as an additional predictor in the main 
effects model of confidence. However, results revealed no significant difference between the 
model and the null (χ2 (1) = .62, p = .43) indicating that confidence in reliability judgement 
was not influenced by vignette word count. 
Finally, a correlation between reliability judgements and confidence ratings was run 
to assess the relationship between the two measures. Across all memory types, a weak 
positive correlation was found (r = .17, p = .005). Correlations were also run for all four 
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vignette combinations: high detail, emotional (r = .36, p = .003); high detail, non-emotional 
(r = .33, p = .005), low detail, emotional (r = .05, p = .70) and low detail, non-emotional (r = 
-.14, p = .25).  Assessment of the results indicate that vignettes with high detail, regardless of 
emotionality yielded significant positive correlations, but this pattern of results was not found 
for vignettes with low detail, regardless of emotionality.  
Discussion 
Partially in line with the hypothesis, results revealed that reliability judgements were 
influenced by the inclusion of detail in a memory account, such that an individual who recalls 
an account and includes specific detail is more likely to be judged to have a reliable memory 
than an individual who includes only vague details. However, contrary to the predictions, 
accounts that were emotional did not receive different reliability judgements than those that 
were non-emotional. We did however find, unexpectedly, that word count influenced 
judgements of believability, such that when the vignettes contained fewer words they were 
rated as more believable. Judgements of believability and reliability were not found to be 
influenced by personality or political affiliation. As with believability, personality and 
political measures were independent of reliability judgements. Confidence was found to 
significantly correlate with believability but only for vignettes in the high detail condition.  
General Discussion 
In this paper we investigated judgements of autobiographical memories of a theft of a 
personal item. In particular, we aimed to understand if believability and reliability are distinct 
constructs, and therefore if they warrant equal and individual examination in future research. 
Additionally, we were interested in understanding if these judgements were malleable, i.e. if 
they could be influenced by the content of a memory. An overview of literature indicated that 
beliefs of memory permanence and emotionality were prevalent amongst the public (and 
indeed, other groups) and as such, we varied memory accounts across detail (indicative of 
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permanence) and emotion. Results showed that judgements of believability and reliability 
were indeed separate constructs, with reliability judgements being influenced by the presence 
of detail (Experiment 2), and believability judgements uninfluenced by either characteristic 
(Experiment 1). Personality and political measures were found to be independent of 
judgements of believability and reliability. Confidence was found to be associated positively 
with believability judgements, however the relationship between confidence and reliability 
judgements was more complex, with only vignettes high in detail yielding a significant 
correlation.  
Detail and Emotion 
Detail in a memory account influences judgements of reliability, but not believability. 
It is perhaps the case in the current research that the difference between high and low detail 
was not enough to elucidate differences in believability judgements, however, the 
manipulation was strong enough to cause variation in reliability judgements. In the present 
study it was found that simply adding concrete detail to statements (for instance describing 
the attacker’s jacket as “dark brown” rather than saying that he was wearing “darkish 
clothes”) was enough to raise reliability judgements by an average of nearly two orders on 
the scale used. There may be a number of reasons as to why vignettes in the high detail 
condition were rated as more reliable than those in the low condition. Firstly, as has been 
noted, there exists a pervasive belief (held by around 60% of the population (Conway et al., 
2014; Simons et al., 2001) that memory operates like a video camera, recording in verbatim, 
or near verbatim, the event in question. It is probable then that a high proportion of the 
participants in this study held this belief too and were more likely to judge a rememberer as 
reliable if they provided a memory that was in line with this belief, that is, one that is specific 
and detailed. The belief bolsters the notion that if an event was experienced then it should be 
remembered, including accurate recollection of detail, regardless of its triviality. Therefore, 
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vignettes that lacked specificity flout this belief, and shed doubt on the abilities of the 
rememberer. Further, vignettes that included specific detail may have received high reliability 
judgements due to perceived confidence of the rememberer (Wixted et al., 2017). A witness 
whose memory lacks specificity, or contains vague or hazy details, may make them appear to 
be unconfident or unsure in their testimony, and hence would yield low judgements of 
reliability. In this study, to afford tight experimental control, we only included additional 
detail around the perpetrator. Future research could vary where detail is included and 
investigate the effects. Indeed, as per Bell et al., (1989), trivial detail has been found to have 
an ameliorative effect on credibility judgements. 
Within research assessing beliefs about CSA and rape, a consistent finding is that 
emotional witnesses are deemed as being more credible than those who are non-emotional 
(Ask & Landstrom, 2010). In the research presented here, neither believability nor reliability 
judgements of accounts of a theft were influenced by its emotionality. As we noted 
previously, what may be important in assessment of credibility may not be the intensity of 
emotion per se, but the perceived appropriateness of emotion to the event. To this end, the 
emotional responses included in the study may not have been perceived as emotionally 
appropriate, or indeed, both responses may have been equally perceived as appropriate, 
rendering similar ratings of believability and reliability. A further explanation may be that 
emotion has a heightened effect on the credibility of sexual abuse memories and affects the 
assessment of other types of memories to a much lesser extent. Indeed, our research was one 
of the first to assess this belief in memories of crimes that were not of a sexual nature (see 
also Landstrom, Ask, Sommar & Willen, 2015). Future research should therefore continue to 
assess the emotional-witness effect (Ask & Landstrom, 2010) across memories of different 
crimes to assess the extent to which the effect is domain specific. Possibly too, the lack of 
influence from statement emotionality may be attributable to a lack of context provided with 
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the memory vignettes. Vignettes in the present study were presented without any 
demographic information about the rememberer. Perhaps without this information, 
judgements are attenuated, or are more difficult to make. Indeed, participants may have 
expectations of emotional appropriateness dependent on both the crime and the victim. In 
other words, features of the memory account, characteristics of the rememberer, and 
information about the event may interact to influence judgements. This would be a valuable 
line of future investigation, having particular pertinence given the onymous nature of many 
testimonies and statements given in legal settings.  
In any case, the present study found that believability and reliability judgements were 
not influenced by the emotionality of the vignette. The lack of variability in judgements may 
reflect the simple fact that emotion is not generally used by individuals to judge the 
believability and reliability of accounts, or at least accounts of a non-sexual nature, as the 
ones in these experiments were. However, one interesting and unexpected finding was that 
the word count of the vignette had a significant impact on the ratings of believability, such 
that an account with fewer words was rated as being more believable than an account with 
more words. Memories, it seems, are more believable when they are succinct and briefly 
described. At a first glance, this result seems to be at odds with the findings from our 
reliability study (Experiment 2) which showed that when more detail is included in an 
account it is judged to be more reliable. We may ask then, what kind of memory account will 
be received most favourably? One that is short and concise to improve judgements of 
believability, or one that is detailed to influence judgements of reliability? It is important, 
however, to note that what drove judgements of reliability was not the amount of detail, but 
the clarity and specificity of detail. Since clear details can be expressed concisely, they are 
also likely to be shorter and hence, judged as more believable. It seems then that detailed 
accounts that are conveyed concisely are most likely to receive high reliability and high 
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believability ratings. Nevertheless, this unexpected finding of account length offers a new 
avenue of research into believability of the memories of others and should be varied 
systematically in future research. 
Personality and Political Measures 
Despite the fact that much previous research has found that some personality traits are 
associated with memory ability / susceptibility (Hyman et al., 1998; Porter et al., 2000), little 
work has investigated how personality differences affect the judgement of the memories of 
others, and no studies were found that had assessed the impact of political orientation on 
memory judgements. Results from the present study however showed neither personality 
traits (as measured by the TIPI and Dirty Dozen) nor political orientation were significantly 
associated with believability and reliability judgements or confidence ratings. This suggests 
that judgements of others’ memories are independent of the individual differences tested 
here.  
Judgements and Self-Reported Confidence  
Believability judgements showed a consistent relationship with confidence. Across all 
conditions, confidence ratings and believability judgements were positively correlated, such 
that higher confidence ratings were associated with higher believability judgements. For 
reliability and confidence judgements, it appears that only memories in the high detail 
condition elicited a significant association. This pattern of results shows that the more 
believable an account is judged to be, the more confident the individual becomes in that 
judgement; participants therefore had confidence in their own truth detection skills. However, 
over-confidence in detecting lies has been found in many studies (see DePaulo, Charlton, 
Cooper, Lindsay & Muhlenbruck, 1997, for a meta-analysis). This finding does not sit neatly 
with our results, which revealed that lower confidence tended to be expressed when 
memories were judged to be less believable. However, perhaps in our experiments the status 
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of the rememberer as an apparent victim, who is therefore vulnerable, has some bearing on 
confidence. It might simply be the case, then, that the participants were giving the 
rememberer the “benefit of the doubt” – in other words if they did not judge the memory 
account to be believable / reliable they were cautious in expressing high confidence.  
Limitations and Future Research 
We recommend future research on the topic of believability and reliability judgments, 
both for the purposes of replication, and to develop understanding of these constructs. To 
support and guide future research, we assess the limitations of our work below.   
We ran manipulation checks to ensure that each pair of vignettes with the same levels 
of detail and emotion were rated similarly, (i.e. we checked that the two vignettes with low 
detail and low emotion were rated similarly for believability and reliability) and found no 
significant differences in ratings between all pairs of vignettes across both experiments (with 
the exception of vignettes high in detail and high in emotion in Experiment 1). Whilst this 
showed us that our manipulations were successful in that they produced similar ratings, we 
cannot be certain that the effects were in fact due to the manipulation of detail and emotion 
since we did not ask participants whether they perceived differences in the content of the 
vignettes. Future research using vignettes manipulated across a number of variables should 
ensure that the manipulations are indeed perceived by the participants to ensure that results 
can be attributed to the variables of interest. 
In each experiment we used a within-subjects design to allow for increased statistical 
power and to reduce the effect of individual differences on results. This design however 
poses problems as participants will have viewed all eight vignettes and may have attempted 
to guess the design and / or hypotheses of the experiment which may in turn have affected the 
results. We did not conduct any post experimental interviews to explicitly test this but 
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encourage future researchers working on similar designs to assess participant’s beliefs about 
the experimental aims. 
We chose to examine believability and reliability judgements separately in two 
experiments as we felt that asking participants to rate 16 vignettes would have been 
repetitious and provided more chance for participants to guess the experimental aims. As 
such, although we found different effects of detail and emotion on believability and 
reliability, such differences may simply be due to variation across participant groups. We 
encourage future research investigating constructs of believability and reliability to examine 
the constructs using within-subjects designs. 
 Null results found in our experiments, particularly around the manipulation of 
emotion may in part be due to crime type chosen. As we noted in our introduction, emotion 
has been found to have a strong effect on credibility, with emotional witnesses often viewed 
as more credible than those that are non-emotional (Ask & Landstrom, 2010). However, 
much of the research surrounding this effect has been conducted in crimes of a sexual nature. 
We wanted to understand if the effect would be replicated in non-sexual crimes and hence 
chose a crime that we believe is unlikely to be sexually motivated. Future research could 
compare assessments of believability and reliability across different crime types to see if the 
effects of emotion and detail produce similar results. 
 Finally, we encourage future research investigating judgements of the memories of 
others to include manipulations of account length. As seen in Experiment 1, word count was 
the only predictor to have a significant effect on assessments of believability. Systematic 
experimental work using word count as an independent variable may produce some 
interesting and important findings. 
Conclusions 
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Our findings have important forensic repercussions, which are relevant to cases when 
individuals lacking expert knowledge about memory are required to judge evidence based 
upon memory. Our results also suggest that believability (truthfulness) and reliability 
(accuracy of memory) are distinct constructs. We propose that future work assessing 
judgements about other people’s memories should investigate believability and reliability 
since both are likely to play an important role throughout the legal process. We have shown 
how reliability judgements of others’ memories are malleable and can be influenced by the 
inclusion of a few minor details. In support of, and in extending the previous literature, we 
have shown that assessing memory is a complex and multi-faceted task. This task is partly 
dependent on erroneous beliefs about how memory operates. Work such as ours, then, is of 
paramount importance in legal settings where scientific memory research is often pervasively 
denied. 
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Appendix 1 
Memory Vignettes 
1 Low detail, non-emotional 
It was June 27th. I was in a coffee shop when someone ran up behind me and pushed me to 
the ground. I realised that my lap top had been stolen. I don’t remember much, just that he 
was dressed in darkish clothes. He might have shouted something at me. I felt quite unafraid. 
 
1a Low detail, non-emotional 
It was March, the 22nd. I was on the way to work he was standing very close then suddenly 
pulled my jacket so hard it ripped. I noticed then he had taken my car keys from my pocket. I 
don’t remember it very clearly, I think he had some kind of tattoo. I think he muttered 
something. I wasn’t very scared. 
 
2 Low detail, emotional 
The day was 14 October. I was in a restaurant and he walked up to the table and jammed it 
towards me He had taken my bank card.  I hardly remember anything about what happened, I 
just remember that he probably had fairish hair. He may have spoken to me. I felt absolutely 
terrified. 
 
2a Low detail, emotional 
The 8th of May, I was on a train. He turned around and bumped into me so hard I fell over. I 
found out after that my passport had been taken. My memory for the event is very hazy. I 
didn’t notice if he had any piercings. He probably said something to me. I was completely 
petrified. 
 
3 High detail, non-emotional 
It happened in December, the 12th. I was standing up on a bus and he was walking towards 
me to get off and aggressively barged straight into me. As he was leaving I realised that he 
had stolen my ipad I remember everything, I remember that he was wearing a dark brown 
jacket and that he shouted “shut up”. I felt relatively calm. 
 
3a High detail, non-emotional 
It was the 7th of September, and I was in a shopping centre. The guy appeared in front of me 
and grabbed me by the arm. That must have been when he stole my watch.  I remember all of 
what happened. He had a black tribal tattoo on his forearm. He spoke, and said “don’t move”. 
I wasn’t that frightened. 
 
4 High detail, emotional 
On the 3rd of February, I was going for a walk. He came from nowhere, shoved me over and 
stole my phone.  My memory of the event is very vivid. He had wiry blonde hair and 
muttered “give me your phone now”. I felt utter panic. 
 
4a High detail, emotional  
The event happened on the 12th of July whilst I was in a queue for the checkout. He was 
standing very close behind me and purposely tripped me over. I went to pay later and realised 
that all my money had been stolen. I remember it so clearly. He had a silver stud in his left 
ear. He said I should keep quiet. I was so frightened. 
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Figure 1. Example fixed and experimental vignette elements 
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Figure 2. Believability ratings as a function of detail and emotion. Chart elements: points = 
individual data points, bar = sample mean, band = 95% highest density interval of the 
population mean, outline = smoothed density. 
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Figure 3. Reliability ratings as a function of detail. Chart elements: points = individual data 
points, bar = sample mean, band = 95% highest density interval of the population mean, 
outline = smoothed density.  
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Figure 4. Reliability ratings as a function of emotion. Chart elements: points = individual 
data points, bar = sample mean, band = 95% highest density interval of the population mean, 
outline = smoothed density.  
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Table 1. Means (and standard deviations) of believability and self-reported confidence for 
each vignette 
Vignette Detail Emotion Believability Confidence 
1 Low Non-emotional 63.02 (24.35) 60.47 (24.68) 
1a Low Non-emotional 63.49 (23.39) 58.14 (24.13) 
2 Low Emotional 66.59 (21.78) 60.23 (24.35) 
2a Low Emotional 69.55 (20.34) 58.18 (24.04) 
3 High Non-emotional 63.18 (20.66) 58.64 (23.19) 
3a High Non-emotional 59.53 (24.1) 60.7 (24.53) 
4 High Emotional 77.44 (17.2) 61.63 (26.09) 
4a High Emotional 57.05 (27.41) 55.91 (24.81) 
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Table 2. Means (and standard deviations) of reliability and self-reported confidence for each 
vignette 
Vignette Detail Emotion Reliability Confidence 
1 Low Non-emotional 48.86 (21.66) 65.43 (15.78) 
1a Low Non-emotional 48.29 (22.56) 63.71 (16.18) 
2 Low Emotional 40.88 (21.79) 61.18 (18.05) 
2a Low Emotional 42.57 (24.89) 61.43 (18.65) 
3 High Non-emotional 64.12 (20.91) 65.88 (19.56) 
3a High Non-emotional 64.29 (19.6) 65.14 (16.34) 
4 High Emotional 60.29 (21.39) 62.65 (19.43) 
4a High Emotional 58.57 (24.75) 61.43 (20.02) 
 
